Introduction
Intentional or accidental large-scale airborne toxic release (e.g. terrorist attacks or industrial accidents) can cause severe harm to nearby communities. Under these circumstances, taking shelter in buildings can be an effective emergency response strategy. Some examples where shelter-in-place was successful at preventing injuries and casualties have been documented [1, 2] . As public education and preparedness are vital to ensure the success of an emergency response, many agencies have prepared documents advising the public on what to do during and after sheltering [3, 4, 5] . In this document, we will focus on the role buildings play in providing protection to occupants.
How effective is sheltering?
The sudden nature of a terrorist or accidental release means that there is often not enough time to safely evacuate the nearby communities. The remaining option is to take shelter until the toxic plume has dispersed. The obvious advantage of staying indoors is that there is a reservoir of clean air contained in buildings. Even though buildings are not airtight, building envelopes restrict the transport of the toxic pollutant to the indoors. The result is that the indoor concentration will increase much slower and remain low relative to the outdoor concentration.
Outdoor-indoor air exchange
When sheltering in buildings, doors and windows should be closed, and ventilation and exhaust fans should be off to minimize air exchange with the outdoors. In such cases, the air change per hour (ACH) is determined by uncontrolled air leakage across the building envelope ( Figure 1) . Air infiltration is a function of the leakiness of the building, and the differential pressures across the envelope, which are caused by indoor-outdoor temperature difference and the forces exerted by wind.
Air infiltration rates can vary from less than 0.1 ACH for a tight house under mild weather conditions to over 1.5 ACH for a leaky house under severe weather conditions ( Table 1) . These values are derived from air leakage measurements of residential houses in the US [7] . Houses in countries where the climate is more severe, such as Sweden, Norway, and Canada, tend to be more airtight than the values presented here [8] . For a conserved contaminant, indoor concentration during sheltering can be predicted using the air infiltration rate and the outdoor concentrations ( Figure  2 ). Houses with high air infiltration rates (e.g. 1 ACH) will permit larger amounts of the toxic material to enter indoors as the outdoor plume arrives. However, due to the rapid exchange with the outdoors, the indoor concentration will also decay much faster compared to tighter houses after the outdoor plume departs. If shelterin-place were maintained in all houses for sufficiently long time, the indoor exposure (time integrated concentration) would eventually approach the outdoor level assuming no toxic material is lost while entering and within the building. Therefore, termination of shelter-in-place is an important part of the overall sheltering strategy in order to minimize exposure. 
Removal mechanisms
Mechanisms by which toxic materials are removed by buildings further decrease the indoor concentration of the toxic material. Building envelopes can remove some bio-aerosols (typical size range 1 to 5 µm) as they infiltrate through cracks. The penetration factor, defined as the fraction of contaminant in the infiltrating air that passes through the building envelope, has been found to be close to 1 for particles that are 1 µm in diameter [9] . Experimental study also suggests that particles larger than 5 µm can have a significantly lower penetration factor in houses with tighter construction [10] . Building envelopes can therefore offer some, but not substantial, protection from outdoor bio-aerosol plumes.
Once inside buildings, bio-aerosols can deposit out of the air onto surfaces. For 1 to 5 µm particles, the loss rate by deposition is equivalent to having an additional fresh air supply of 0.1 to 1 ACH [11] . Figure 3 shows the indoor concentrations at different loss rates. At a loss rate of 1 h -1 , the indoor concentration drops to less than 1% of the outdoor peak concentration several hours before the no-loss case does. On the other hand, a loss rate of 0.1 h -1 has little effect on the indoor concentration. Resuspension of particles, a process not considered here, can reintroduce deposited particles into the air and changes the airborne concentration.
The penetration factor of gases is highly dependent on the pollutantsurface reaction probability, which is defined as the ratio of removal rate to the collision rate of the gaseous species on the surface [12] . However, sorption to indoor surfaces, which may include adsorption, absorption, and chemical binding, is likely to be the dominate removal mechanism for chemical agents. Similar to particle deposition, loss rate by sorption is also highly sensitive to the level of furnishing and other indoor conditions. Sorbed chemicals can also slowly desorb from surfaces. Room-scale experiments indicate that the sorption loss rate of NH 3 , Cl 2 , SO 2 , sarin, and VX are equivalent to having an additional fresh air supply of 1 ACH [13, 14, 15] , which is significantly more rapid compared to the typical air change rate of 0.3 h -1 . 
Health effects
Health effects of many chemicals are best described by the "toxic load rate". Toxic load rate is the airborne concentration of the chemical raised to an appropriate exponent. For an agent with a high exponent (e.g. H 2 S has an exponent of 4, some nerve agents have an exponent of 2), exposure to high concentration for a short time is worse than exposure to a lower concentration for a proportionally longer duration of time. This non-linear dose-response characteristic means that sheltering is very effective in preventing injuries and fatalities because the indoor concentration remains much lower than the outdoor during the release (Figure 2) . After the plume has passed, the indoor concentration rises above the outdoor. Therefore, sheltering should be terminated by opening windows and doors to avoid prolonged exposure to the residues that remain indoors. The exact timing of termination will depend on the characteristics of the release as well as the protectiveness of buildings against the agent. In general, termination time is most critical if sheltering in leaky buildings from a highly concentrated puff release of an agent that does not undergo deposition or sorption indoors.
Role of ventilation systems
Most commercial buildings have some form of heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning system (HVAC) that includes an air-filter to remove particles, and in some cases an air-cleaner to remove gases. For bio-aerosols in the size range of 1 to 5 µm, many air-filters might have limited collection efficiency depending on the particular design and loading on the filter [16] . Commonly used air-cleaning media is even less effective against most chemical warfare agents. Special chemically active sorbents might be needed to achieve significant removal. Filter or sorbent bypass is another problem that can limit the efficiency of such system. Furthermore, operation of the ventilation system can increase the overall air exchange with the outdoors which is undesirable during sheltering. The default advice is therefore to shut down the mechanical ventilation system and bathroom exhaust fans in response to an outdoor release [17] . Intake and exhaust dampers should also be fully closed.
Commercial buildings further differ from small residential buildings because the air within the former cannot be considered well-mixed throughout the building. Consequently, the indoor concentrations in various parts of the building will depend also on the interzonal airflows [18] and will not be uniform throughout the building (Figure 4) . When the HVAC is operating, transport of the contaminant within the building is determined by the airflow directed by the air handling units and duct systems. Typically, air is rapidly mixed within a zone, but airzones are designed to be isolated from one another. When the HVAC is turned off, the overall airflow and within-zone mixing is much reduced. However, the contaminant can now spread throughout the entire building with time. Under such circumstances, indoor concentrations can vary greatly depending on the weather conditions and the air leakage pathways of the building.
Proactive measures
Apart from closing all doors and windows, and turning off ventilation systems, a range of measures can be taken to make buildings more protective from an outdoor release ( Figure 5 ). Simple taping of doors and vents, and plastic sheet over windows can reduce air infiltration to some extent [19] , particularly when an interior room is chosen for the sheltering. More permanent modifications can include weatherization techniques such as caulking to improve the airtightness of residential dwellings [20] . Larger and more vulnerable buildings might install a filtration system to supply clean air at a positive pressure that can prevent contaminated air from leaking in. Active filtration can also take the form of a stand-alone air purifying unit containing HEPA and activated carbon filters [21, 22] . 
Discussion
While the idea of shelter-in-place is straightforward, challenges remain in characterizing the benefits of sheltering under realistic scenarios. Large variability in building characteristics means that there is a range of shelter-in-place effectiveness. There are also considerable uncertainties owing to the limited understanding of some of the indoor transport mechanisms and fate of airborne toxic materials. Even so, past experiences and preliminary investigations have pointed to shelter-in-place as a promising emergency response strategy. Figure 6 is a simulation of the expected harm reduction from sheltering for a community in Albuquerque from a hypothetical large-scale chlorine gas release [23] . Air infiltration rates of the houses are estimated based on the air leakage characteristics and the weather conditions during the release. Estimation of sorption to indoor surfaces is also included. At the end of the 4-hour release, the area at risk of life-threatening effects is an order of magnitude smaller if people were sheltering indoors for the duration of the release than if everyone were outdoors. Sheltering can be even more effective than shown here for releases of a shorter duration, and if suitable proactive measure and strategy is deployed.
Illustrated in

Figure 6: Predicted health effects based on US EPA's Acute Exposure Guidelines [24] of a hypothetical 4-hour chlorine gas release in Albuquerque if shelter-inplace is implemented (right) compared to if everyone is outdoors (left).
Conclusion
o Under most circumstances, shelter-in-place is an effective response against large-scale outdoor releases. This is particularly true for release of short duration (a few hours or less) and chemicals that exhibit non-linear dose-response characteristics. o The building envelope not only restricts the outdoor-indoor air exchange, but can also filter some biological or even chemical agents. Once indoors, the toxic materials can deposit or sorb onto indoor surfaces. All these processes contribute to the effectiveness of shelter-in-place. o Tightening of building envelope and improved filtration can enhance the protection offered by buildings. Common mechanical ventilation system present in most commercial buildings, however, should be turned off and dampers closed when sheltering from an outdoor release. o After the passing of the outdoor plume, some residuals will remain indoors. It is therefore important to terminate shelter-in-place to minimize exposure to the toxic materials.
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